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the reasonable doubt standard by providing a third option to a choice
between conviction and acquittal."0 3 Since the defendant in Williams had
a right to an instruction on the lesser included offense, the Fourth Cir-
cuit erred in implying a waiver of the statute of limitations from the
defendant's request.
Although the Fourth Circuit in Williams correctly found that a
criminal defendant may waive the statute of limitations, the facts in
Williams do not give rise to the implication of a valid waiver."' The
Fourth Circuit's implication of a waiver in Williams is inconsistent with
Supreme Court precedent that requires a knowing and voluntary waiver
to forego rights that affect the integrity of the trial process."0 5 Moreover,
the Fourth Circuit erred in implying the defendant's waiver from the
defendant's request for an instruction of the lesser included offense. The
Williams decision compromises the policies behind the limitation
statutes by allowing trial and punishment for crimes Congress designed
the statutes to preclude.
ROBERT C. MOOT, JR.
VII. ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
Receiving Water Quality Not Appropriate BPT Variance Factor
The Federal Water Pollution Control Act of 1972 (Act)1 established a
13 See supra 412 U.S. 205, 212-13; supra note 101.
' See supra note 98.
... See supra text accompanying notes 89-99.
33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1976 & Supp. V 1981). The Federal Water Pollution Control
Act (Act) adopted a new approach to eliminate pollution. See EPA v. California ex rel. State
Water Resource Control Bd., 426 U.S. 200, 203-04 (1976). From 1948 until 1972, state water
quality standards provided the basis for the establishment of effluent limitations. Id. at 202,
n.2. Effluent limitations are measurements of the actual amount of pollutants discharged at
a particular source. See Niagara of Wisconsin Paper Corp. v. Wisconsin Dep't of Natural
Resources, 84 Wis. 2d 32, , 268 N.W.2d 153, 163 (1978. Prior to 1972, states varied ef-
fluent limitation requirements for various dischargers according to the discharger's impact
on the desired water quality standard. Id. at __ , 268 N.W.2d at 163. Pollution control
based on state water quality standards, however, created numerous regulatory problems.
Hercules, Inc. v. EPA, 598 F.2d 91, 105 (D.C. Cir. 1978). In American Frozen Food Institute
v. Train, the District of Columbia Circuit recognized the major problem regarding lack of
uniform pollution control prior to 1972. See 539 F.2d 107, 115 (D.C. Cir. 1976). The Frozen
Foods court stated that uniformity was necessary to prevent states from relaxing pollution
standards to encourage existing industries to remain in the state or to attract new in-
dustries. Id. The Supreme Court in EPA v. California ex rel State Water Resources Con-
trol Board acknowledged the need for uniform water pollution standards to facilitate the en-
forcement of pollution regulations. See 426 U.S. at 203. The Supreme Court stated that the
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national goal to eliminate the discharge of pollutants by 1985.2 Under the
Act, dischargers of pollutants' must participate in a two-stage program
rejection of water quality based pollution controls eliminated the burdensome task of work-
ing backwards from first identifying an overpolluted body of water to later determining the
responsible source of pollution and then finally to applying the necessary sanctions. Id. at
204.
In enacting the Act, Congress recognized the need to eliminate the lengthy delays due
to the requirements of scientific assessments of the effect of various sources of pollution on
water quality. See SENATE COMM. ON PUBLIC WORKS, FEDERAL WATER POLLUTION CONTROL
ACT AMENDMENTS OF 1972, S. REP. No. 92-414, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 2770, reprinted in A
LEGLISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE WATER POLLUTION CONTROL ACT AMENDMENTS OF 1972, at
1419, 1426 (1973) [hereinafter cited as LEGISLATIVE HISTORY]. Numerous scientific uncertain-
ties also make accurate assessment of the actual consequences of various pollutants in
water quality difficult. See Note, The Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of
1972: Ambiguity as a Control Device, 10 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 565, 571-72 (1973). A contrasting
theory, however, suggests that adequate scientific information exists to allow considera-
tions of the economic impracticalities of treating a particular level or type of pollution when
establishing optimal pollution controls. See W. BAXTER, PEOPLE AND PENGUINS: THE CASE
FOR OPTIMAL POLLUTION (1974).
Congress enacted the 1972 Act to remedy some of the problems inherent in the
previous system of water pollution control. See California ex rel. State Water Resources,
426 U.S. at 204-05. The Act shifted the pollution control system's emphasis from reliance on
effluent limitations derived from state water quality standards to technologically-based ef-
fluent limitations. Id. The Act authorizes the EPA to set uniform effluent limitations for dif-
ferent classes and categories of dischargers. Id. at 204 n.11. In establishing effluent limita-
tions, the EPA determines the extent to which a particular class of dischargers may reduce
effluents through the application of specific forms of technology. Id. The EPA then pro-
mulgates regulations requiring all dischargers within a particular class to comply with the
applicable effluent limitations. Id.
2 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(1) (1976); see Consolidation Coal Co. v. Costle, 604 F.2d 239, 242
(4th Cir. 1979), rev'd on other grounds sub nom., EPA v. National Crushed Stone Ass'n, 449
U.S. 64 (1982). In Consolidation Coal, the Fourth Circuit described the Act as a legislative
directive to restore and maintain the chemical, physical and biological integrity of the na-
tion's waters. Id. The Consolidation Coal court held that courts must give the Act the
broadest possible reading consistent with the commerce clause to facilitate attainment of
the Act's goal. Id. at 243; see Leslie Salt Co. v. Froehlke, 578 F.2d 742, 754-55 (9th Cir. 1978)
(Act's jurisdiction extends to all of nation's navigable waters). Courts have defined broadly
the term "pollutants" referred to in the Act. See Weyerhaeuser v. Costle, 590 F.2d 1011,
1043 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (pollutant is any addition to water that alters chemical, physical,
biological or radiological integrity of the water); Appalachian Power Co. v. Train, 545 F.2d
1351, 1356 (4th Cir. 1976) (heat recognized as pollutant); Weiszmann v. District Eng'r U.S.
Army Corps of Eng'rs, 526 F.2d 1302, 1306 (5th Cir. 1976) (sediment from developer's dredg-
ing constituted pollutant); United States v. Reserve Mining Co., 380 F. Supp. 11, 56 (D.
Minn. 1974) (asbestos-like amphibole fibers directly associated with occurrences of cancer
constitute pollutant), modified on other grounds, 514 F.2d 492 (8th Cir. 1975). But see Train
v. Colorado Pub. Interest Research Group, Inc., 426 U.S. 1, 13 (1976) (specific types of
radioactive materials covered by Atomic Energy Act not considered pollutants); 2 U.S.C. §§
2011-2296 (1976 & Supp. 1980) (Atomic Energy Act).
' See 33 U.S.C. § 1311 (1976). Section 1311 provides that the discharge of any pollutant
by any person is unlawful. Id. "Discharge" involves the addition of any pollutant from any
discrete container or conveyance into the nation's navigable waters. United States v. Ox-
ford Royal Mushroom Prods. Inc., 487 F. Supp. 852, 855 (E.D. Pa. 1980). Navigable waters in-
clude any waterways of the United States, such as normally dry arroyos, where water
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involving the application of increasingly stringent pollution controls.4
The first stage' requires existing industrial dischargers to apply the
best practical technology available (BPT)8 to meet a specific 1977 effluent
reduction level.7 The second stage8 requires dischargers to apply the
best technology economically achievable (BAT)9 to meet a higher effluent
reduction level by 198.10
Section 304(b) of the Act authorizes the Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) to define BPT and BAT requirements for general
categories of point sources.1 The EPA must consider specific factors
listed in section 304 of the Act when setting BPT and BAT re-
might flow and potentially carry discharged pollutants into a body of water, including
underground waters. United States v. Phelps Dodge Corp., 391 F. Supp. 1181, 1187 (D. Ariz.
1975). Any person who adds pollutants to the nation's navigable waters may be a discharger
within the meaning of the Act. See United States v. Earth Sciences, Inc., 599 F.2d 368, 373
(10th Cir. 1979) (person engaged in agricultural or mining activities may qualify as
discharger); BASF Wyandotte Corp. v. Costle, 598 F.2d 637, 644 (1st Cir. 1979) (pesticide
manufacturers who release effluents into waterways during chemical formulation process
may be discharger of pollutants); P.F.Z. Properties, Inc. v. Train, 393 F. Supp. 1370, 1381
(D. D.C. 1975) (hotel complex developers dumping rock and sand refuse into mangrove
wetlands are dischargers of water pollutants). But see United States v. GAF Corp., 389 F.
Supp. 1379, 1383 (S.D. Tex. 1975) (discharge of pollutants into subsurface wells not covered
by Act). Furthermore, the Act does not only pertain to the intentional discharge of
pollutants. See United States v. Earth Sciences, Inc., 599 F.2d at 373 (Act makes
dischargers of any pollutant strictly liable).
33 U.S.C. § 1311(b) (1976 & Supp. V. 1981); see EPA v. National Crushed Stone
Ass'n, 449 U.S. 64, 75 n.14 (1980) (requirements under the second stage of Act's program
must represent an upgrading over first stage requirements); American Frozen Food Inst. v.
Train, 539 F.2d 107, 115 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (Act authorizes EPA to set interim effluent reduc-
tion levels to facilitate gradual progress toward elimination of discharge of pollutants); infra
notes 5-10 (establishment of BPT guidelines for various categories of dischargers).
' See 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b)(1)(A) (1976) (establishment of effluent limitations under first
stage of water pollution control program).
I Id. § 1314(b)(1)(B); see infra note 13 (factors related to assessment of best practicable
technology available).
' See EPA Effluent Limitations Guidelines, 40 C.F.R. § 423.12 (1982) (specific BPT
limitations for various categories of steam electric power generating point sources).
' See 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b)(2)(A) (Supp. V 1981) (establishment of effluent limitations for
second stage of water pollution control program).
' Id. at § 1314(b)(2)(B) (Supp. V 1981); see infra note 13 (specific factors related to
assessment of best technology economically achievable).
"' See EPA Effluent Limitation Guidelines, 40 C.F.R. § 423.13 (1982) (specific BAT
limitations for various categories of steam electric power generating point sources).
" 33 U.S.C. § 1314(b) (1976); see id. at § 1362(14) (Supp. V 1981). Section 1362(14) defines
"point source" as including any discernible and discrete conveyance from which pollutants
are or may be discharged. Id. Point source does not include return flows from irrigated
agriculture. Id. Section 1314(b) of the Act authorizes the EPA to define BPT and BAT
limitations and § 1311 authorizes the EPA to promulgate regulations requiring compliance
with the established BPT and BAT limitations. §§ 1311, 1314(b); see E.I. duPont de Nemours
& Co. v. Train, 430 U.S. 112, 117 (1977). In E.I duPont, the Supreme Court decided that the
EPA may set BPT and BAT limitations by regulation if the EPA also includes BPT and
BAT variance clauses. Id.
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quirements. 1 The EPA generally collects data pertaining to section 304
factors from a representative sample of plants within a particular
category of point sources. 3 The EPA then establishes generic BPT and
BAT requirements applicable to all plants within a particular industrial
category. 4 If the EPA determines that the application of generic BPT re-
quirements to plants with fundamental individual differences is inap-
propriate, 5 the EPA may vary BPT and BAT requirements for the in-
1" See 33 U.S.C. §§ 1314(b)(1)(B), 1314(b)(2)(B) (1976 & Supp. V 1981). The Act authorizes
the EPA, when setting BPT limitations, to consider factors such as the total cost of the ap-
plication of technology in relation to effluent reduction benefits achieved from such applica-
tion, the age of the equipment and facilities involved, the process employed, engineering
aspects of the application of different control techniques, process changes, non-water quality
environmental impacts (including energy requirements), and other factors the EPA deems
appropriate. Id. § 1314(b)(1)(B). Regarding consideration of cost factors, dischargers must
show that increased costs in implementing BPT requirements would be wholly dispropor-
tionate to potential effluent reduction before the EPA may rely on a cost-benefit analysis to
select a lower level of technology. Association of Pac. Fisheries v. EPA, 615 F.2d 794, 805
(9th Cir. 1980).
The Act requires the EPA, when assessing BAT requirements, to consider factors
relating to the age of the equipment and facilities involved, process employed, engineering
aspects of the application of various types of control techniques, process changes, the act of
achieving effluent reduction, non-water quality environmental impact and other factors the
EPA deems appropriate. 33 U.S.C. § 1314(b)(2)(B) (Supp. V 1981).
,3 See American Petroleum Inst. v. EPA, 540 F.2d 1023, 1034 (10th Cir. 1976). When
establishing BPT requirements, the EPA must consider data from exemplary plants using
the best technology, rather than the average technology in the industry. Id. The First Cir-
cuit has held that the EPA even may assess technologies not yet applied if it is reasonable
to believe that the technology might be available. United States Steel Corp. v. Train, 556
F.2d 822, 841-42 (1st Cir. 1976); see Association of Pac. Fisheries v. EPA, 615 F.2d 794, 819
(9th Cir. 1980) (EPA may base BAT requirements on information from a single model plant
if EPA demonstrates effectiveness of required technology).
4 See E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co. v. Train, 430 U.S. 112,117 (1977) (BPT and BAT re-
quirements do not refer only to certain individual dischargers but are applicable to all
dischargers within a particular category).
15 See C.F. American Iron & Steel Inst. v. EPA, 568 F.2d 284, 307 (3rd Cir. 1977). The
American Iron court acknowledged the need to allow flexibility in the federal pollution con-
trol system to accommodate diverse conditions among dischargers across the country. Id. In
In re Louisiana-Pacific Corp., the EPA asserted that under certain circumstances the EPA
may adjust general BPT requirements for individual plants. 10 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1841,
1843 n.4 (1977). The EPA stated that individual dischargers may submit evidence that fac-
tors relating to a particular plant are fundamentally different from factors considered dur-
ing the establishment of national effluent guidelines. Id. at 1843-44. Section 304 of the Act
defines the factors the EPA must consider when evaluating fundamental differences rele-
vant to a BPT variance request. Id. If the EPA finds a fundamental difference in section 304
factors, the EPA may establish less stringent effluent limitations for a particular plant. Id.
at 1843 n.4. The EPA need not consider an individual discharger's economic capability to
comply with the generic BPT requirements. See EPA v. National Crushed Stone Ass'n, 449
U.S. 64, 78 (1978). In National Crushed Stone the Supreme Court noted that Congress had
anticipated and accepted the economic hardship that BPT requirements would cause, in-
cluding plant closure. Id. at 79. The National Crushed Stone Court also noted that the pur-
pose of BPT limitations was to avoid requiring the EPA to determine the economic impact
of BPT controls on any individual plant. Id.
[Vol. 40:459
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dividual plants.8 Section 301(c) of the Act specifies the factors that the
EPA must consider when evaluating a BAT variance request." The Act
does not provide a comparable variance provision regarding BPT re-
quirements."
In 1974 the EPA promulgated a regulation establishing a BPT
variance provision for steam electric plants. 9 The regulation required
the EPA to consider several specific factors when evaluating a BPT
variance request. 0 The 1980 amended version of the regulation
specifically prohibits the EPA from considering receiving water quality
as a BPT variance factor.21 In Appalachian Power Co. v. Costle (Ap-
palachian III)' the Fourth Circuit considered whether the EPA's exclu-
sion of receiving water quality from the BPT variance provision com-
plied with the plain language of the Act and the Fourth Circuit's prior
ruling in Appalachian Power Co. v. Train (Appalachian I).
In Appalachian I, several steam electric power companies contested
a variance provision that authorized the EPA to grant a BPT variance
request when factors relating to an individual plant were fundamentally
different from factors considered in the establishment of generic BPT re-
quirements.24 The Appalachian I court accepted the steam electric com-
panies' contention that the EPA's BPT variance provision was unduly
restrictive in failing to require the EPA's consideration of certain fac-
tors.' The Appalachian I court concluded that the EPA must amend the
"C See E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co. v. Train, 430 U.S. 112, 128 (1977) (variance pro-
vision necessary aspect of BPT limitations).
" See 33 U.S.C. § 1311(c) (1976). When evaluating a BAT variance request the EPA
must consider whether the modified requirements will represent the maximum use of
technology within the economic capability of the owner or operator of a particular point
source and will result in reasonable further progress toward the elimination of the
discharge of pollutants. Id.
" See EPA v. National Crushed Stone Ass'n, 449 U.S. 69, 72 (1980) (no explicit
variance provision exists with respect to BPT requirements).
" See 40 C.F.R. § 423.12(a) (1976) (amended 1980). The 1974 BPT variance clause per-
mitted individual dischargers to submit evidence that factors relating to the equipment or
facilities involved, the process applied, or other factors related to the dischargers were fun-
damentally different from the factors considered in the establishment of general BPT
guidelines. Id.
See id. (factors EPA must consider when granting BPT variance requests).
21 See id. § 423.12(a) (1982). The current BPT variance provision states that the EPA
may not consider a discharger's impact on receiving water quality as a factor relevant to the
evaluation of a variance request. Id.
671 F.2d 801 (4th Cir. 1982).
545 F.2d 1351 (4th Cir. 1976); see 671 F.2d at 806.
24 See 545 F.2d at 1359. The Appalachian I court interpreted the 1974 BPT variance
provision as prohibiting considerations of potential costs to dischargers complying with
BPT requirements. Id. The power companies in Appalachian I argued that the phrase
"other such factors" in the BPT variance provision referred to economic factors. Id.
I See id. In Appalachian I, the Fourth Circuit held that the 1974 BPT variance provis- -
ion for steam electric plants was too restrictive because the provision excluded considera-
tions of cost relating to individual dischargers. Id.
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variance provision to include consideration of the factors outlined in sec-
tions 301(c) and 304(b) of the Act.26
In 1978 the EPA amended the BPT variance provision to comply
with the Appalachian I court's ruling.' The 1978 variance provision did
not specify receiving water quality as a relevant BPT variance factor."
In Appalachian Power Company v. Train (Appalachian II,' the power
companies challenged the 1978 amended variance provision on the
ground that the EPA intended to exclude receiving water quality as a
BPT variance factor." The Appalachian I1 court held that the power
companies' challenge was premature absent a clear statement of the
EPA's position regarding receiving water quality." In Appalachian 11
the Fourth Circuit stated in dicta that receiving water quality was an ap-
propriate BPT variance factor.
32
In 1980, The EPA further amended the BPT variance provision
specifically to prohibit the EPA from considering receiving water quality
when evaluating a BPT variance request.2 In Appalachian III, several
' See id. The Fourth Circuit based the conclusion in Appalachian I on the court's in-
terpretation of the statutory structure of the Act. Id. The Appalachian I court initially
noted that § 301(c) allows the EPA to consider affordability factors when evaluating a BAT
variance request. Id.; see supra note 17 (section 301(c) factors). The Appalachian I court
reasoned that an exclusion of considerations of affordability in the BPT variance provision
provided the EPA with more flexibility in granting BAT variances than BPT variances. 545
F.2d at 1359. The court further reasoned that since the Act's two-stage program for elimina-
tion of pollution involved the application of increasingly stringent controls, the flexibility
allowed in the establishment of 1983 BAT requirements necessarily must be available for
the establishment of 1977 BPT requirements. Id. The court therefore held that the EPA
also must consider § 301(c) affordability factors when evaluating BPT variance requests. Id.
' See EPA Effluent Limitation Guidelines, 40 C.F.R. § 423.12(a) (1978) (amended 1980).
The 1978 steam electric variance provision stated that the relevant factors in granting BPT
variances may include significant cost differentials and the factors listed in § 301(c) of the
Act. Id.; see supra note 17 (list of § 301(c) factors).
40 C.F.R. § 423.12(a) (1978) (amended 1980); see supra note 27 (1978 BPT variance
provision for steam electric plants).
620 F.2d 1040 (4th Cir. 1980).
1 Id. at 1042. In Appalachian II the power companies argued that the amended
variance provision failed to require consideration of § 304(b)(1)(c) factors including "total
cost ... in relation to effluent reduction benefit." Id. at 1044. The power companies urged
that effluent reduction benefits included improvements in receiving water quality. Id.
Refusal to consider effluent reduction benefits therefore resulted in the elimination of
receiving water quality as a BPT variance factor. Id.
" See id. (EPA had not taken any action with respect to the 1978 BPT variance provis-
ion at the time of Appalachian 11).
Id. at 1046. In Appalachian II, the Fourth Circuit reasoned that § 301(c) factors
relating to reasonable further progress included possible considerations of improvements in
receiving water quality. Id. Since the 1978 BPT variance provision.allowed consideration of
§ 301(c) factors, the Appalachian II court concluded that the EPA also may consider receiv-
ing water quality when evaluating a BPT variance request. Id.; see supra note 17 (section
301(c) factors).




steam electric companies contended that the EPA's refusal to consider
receiving water quality violated the language of the Act as well as the
Fourth Circuit's ruling in Appalachian L' The power companies argued
that the Appalachian I court's ruling required the EPA to consider fac-
tors listed in sections 304(b) and 301(c) when evaluating a BPT variance
request.35 In Appalachian III, the power companies asserted that the
term "effluent reduction benefits" in section 304(b) and the phrase
"reasonable further progress" in section 301(c) referred to im-
provements in receiving water quality. 6 The power companies in Ap-
palachian III contended that the Fourth Circuit therefore must require
the EPA to consider receiving water quality as a BPT variance factor.1
7
The Appalachian III court upheld the EPA's 1980 amended BPT
variance provision.38 The Appalachian III court stated that the EPA's
determination that receiving water quality was not an appropriate BPT
variance factor was consistent with the language of the Act. 9 The Ap-
palachian III court reasoned that the Supreme Court's holding in EPA v.
National Crushed Stone Association" supported the EPA's exclusion of
receiving water quality as a BPT variance factor." In National Crushed
Stone, the Supreme Court rejected the requirement that the EPA con-
sider section 301(c) cost factors when establishing generic BPT re-
quirements.42 In Appalachian III, the Fourth Circuit reasoned that since
3' 671 F.2d 801, 806 (4th Cir. 1982); see 545 F.2d at 1359 (Appalachian I court's directive
to EPA to consider §§ 301(c) and 304(b) factors in BPT variance evaluation).
1 671 F.2d at 807; 545 F.2d at 1359; see supra note 12 (section 304(b) factors); supra
note 17 (section 301(c) factors).
- 671 F.2d at 805-09, 809 n.3; see supra note 12 (section 304(b) factors); supra note 17
(section 301(c) factors).
671 F.2d at 806.
Id. at 809; see supra note 21 (1980 BPT variance provision amendment).
671 F.2d at 808.
,0 449 U.S. 64 (1980).
" 671 F.2d at 808.
"2 449 U.S. at 75. The National Crushed Stone Court held that § 301(c) factors did not
apply to BPT requirements. Id. The National Crushed Stone Court stated that the phrase
"maximum use of technology within [a discharger's] economic capability" under § 301(c) did
not apply to BPT requirements. Id. The Supreme Court noted that BPT guidelines, unlike
BAT guidelines, do not require dischargers to commit their maximum economic resources
to pollution control. Id. A BPT variance provision allowing considerations of a discharger's
economic capability, therefore, would be inapposite. Id. The Supreme Court also rejected
the coal companies' argument that a BPT variance provision must allow for considerations
of affordability to provide the EPA with the same amount of flexibility in establishing both
BAT and BPT limitations. Id. at 84 n.26. The coal companies reasoned that since the Act
provided for the application of increasingly stringent controls, BPT limitations, which the
EPA applies prior to BAT limitations, must be as flexible as BAT limitations. Id. In rejecting
the coal companies' argument, the National Crushed Stone Court stated that allowing the
EPA to consider affordability when evaluating BAT variances but prohibiting considera-
tions of affordability in BPT variance evaluations did not necessarily provide the EPA with
more flexibility regarding BAT guidelines. Id. at 84. The Supreme Court emphasized that
the EPA may grant BAT variances only after the discharger meets the minimal BPT
1983]
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section 301(c) cost factors did not apply to BPT requirements, other sec-
tion 301(c) factors also did not apply.43 The Appalachian III court conclud-
ed that receiving water quality did not apply to BPT requirements to the
extent that the Act defines receiving water quality as a factor under sec-
tion 301(c).44
The Appalachian III court also decided that the EPA's exclusion of
receiving water quality in the 1980 BPT variance provision complied
with the plain language of section 304 of the Act.45 The Appalachian III
court reasoned that several circuit courts' decisions and the legislative
history of the Act supported the conclusion that the phrase "effluent
reduction benefits" in section 304(b) did not refer to improvements in
receiving water quality.46 The Appalachian III court concluded that
although the EPA must consider section 304(b) factors when evaluating
BPT variance requests, the Act did not require the EPA to consider
receiving water quality since receiving water quality was not a section
304(b) factor.
The Appalachian III court relied on the Supreme Court's decision in
National Crushed Stone as support for the EPA's refusal to consider
receiving water quality as a BPT variance factor.48 In National Crushed
Stone, various coal mining companies asserted that the EPA must con-
sider section 301(c) factors, including an individual plant's economic in-
ability to meet the costs of implementing generic BPT requirements,
when evaluating a BPT variance request.49 The coal companies contended
that the 1977 BPT variance provision was unduly restrictive since the
guideline. Id. In addition, the Supreme Court held that allowing the EPA to grant BPT
variances because owners could not meet the costs of implementing the required technology
would impede progress towards the Act's goal of effluent elimination. Id. at 78. The Na-
tional Crushed Stone Court also noted that Congress passed the Act aware that BPT re-
quirements would create economic hardships. Id. at 79; see supra note 15 (congressional
recognition of economic hardships created by BPT requirements).
" 671 F.2d at 808; see supra note 17 (section 301(c) factors).
" 671 F.2d at 808. The Appalachian III court's reliance on National Crushed Stone did
not preclude the possibility that other sections of the Act may allow considerations of
receiving water quality. See supra note 30 (possible considerations of receiving water quality
under § 304(b) of the Act).
" 671 F.2d at 808-09; see supra note 12 (section 304(b) factors).
" 671 F.2d at 808; see 33 U.S.C. § 1314(b) (1976 & Supp. V 1981). Section 304(b)
authorizes the EPA to consider the relation of total cost to effluent reduction benefits when
establishing BPT guidelines. Id. Courts generally agree that the term "effluent reduction
benefits" does not refer to improvements in receiving water quality. See Weyerhaeuser Co.
v. Costle, 590 F.2d 1011, 1045 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (effluent reduction benefits defined by amount
or degree of reduction achieved through application of certain level of technology); C.F.
American Iron & Steel Inst. v. EPA, 568 F.2d 284, 297 (3rd Cir. 1977) (effluent reduction
benefits do not include assessments of water quality impact).
" 671 F.2d at 808; see supra note 46 (exclusion of receiving water quality as § 304(b)
factor).
671 F.2d at 808; see 449 U.S. 64 (1980).
4' 449 U.S. at 72.
[Vol. 40:459
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provision did not include the economic capability of a particular plant
operator as a BPT variance factor.' The Supreme Court in National
Crushed Stone held that the Act does not require the EPA to consider
section 301(c) affordability factors when evaluating a BPT variance re-
quest for the coal mining industry.51 In considering the affordability
question, the Supreme Court stated that the general factors listed in sec-
tion 301(c) bore a substantial relationship only to BAT requirements, not
to BPT requirements.2 The National Crushed Stone Court reasoned that
the phrase "reasonable further progress" in section 301(c) required the
existence of some prior standard against which the EPA could measure
the amount of progress.' Although BPT requirements serve as prior
standards for BAT requirements, no prior standards exist for BPT re-
quirements.- The Supreme Court concluded that the phrase "reasonable
further progress" meant that section 301(c) factors applied only to BAT
variances and not to BPT variances." In addition, the National Crushed
Stone Court stated that varying BPT requirements based on the
economic capability of individual dischargers would undercut the pur-
pose and function of BPT limitations. 8 The Supreme Court noted that
the Act emphasized strict adherence to technologically-based pollution
controls as the necessary means to eliminate the discharge of
pollutants. 7 The Supreme Court concluded that allowing variances based
on the discharger's economic capability would allow dischargers to
resort to practices that would impede effluent elimination.'
Although the Supreme Court has not addressed the issue of whether
section 304(b) requires the EPA to consider receiving water quality,
other circuit courts have held that the phrase "effluent reduction
benefits" under section 304(b) of the Act does not require the EPA to
consider receiving water quality as a BPT variance factor.59 In
I Id.; see supra note 42 (National Crushed Stone Court's analysis of relationship of §
301(c) affordability factors to BPT variance provision).
51 449 U.S. at 72; see supra note 42 (National Crushed Stone Court's rationale for ex-
clusion of § 301(c) affordability factors from BPT variance provision).
449 U.S. at 73; see supra note 17 (section 301(c) factors).
449 U.S. at 75.
54 Id.
' Id.; see supra note 42 (National Crushed Stoned Court's reasons for exclusion of
§ 301(c) afforadability factors from BPT variance provision).
449 U.S. at 76.
5 Id. The National Crushed Stone Court noted that Congress, in enacting the Act, ex-
pected all dischargers to either conform to BPT standards or cease production. Id. Allowing
variances based on a discharger's inability to meet BPT implementation costs would
frustrate congressional intent. Id.
5 Id.
" See Crown Simpson Pulp Co. v. Costle, 642 F.2d 323, 327 (9th Cir. 1981) (EPA may-
not grant BPT variances on basis of receiving water quality alone); Association of Pac.
Fisheries v. EPA, 615 F.2d 794, 807 n.8 (9th Cir. 1980) (BPT variances not based on con-
siderations of receiving water quality at individual discharger's sites); Weyerhaeuser Co. v.
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Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Costle,l the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed
the EPA's refusal to consider receiving water quality as a section 304
factor relevant to a BPT variance request."' In Weyerhaeuser, several
paper mill operators who discharged effluents into the Pacific Ocean pro-
tested the EPA's refusal to consider the ocean's capacity to dilute or ab-
sorb pollutants when establishing effluent limitations.2 The paper mill
operators argued that the amount of pollutants discharged was small in
comparison to the vastness of the Pacific Ocean and that the EPA
therefore should modify effluent limitations for paper mill operators
discharging into the ocean.' The District of Columbia Circuit stated that
the EPA may grant a BPT variance only when section 304 factors for an
individual paper mill operator were fundamentally different from the
factors considered in the establishment of generic BPT standards.u The
District of Columbia Circuit referred to the comparison of section 304
factors in a BPT variance evaluation as the "fundamental difference"
test. 5 The District of Columbia Circuit concluded that receiving water
quality was not a section 304 factor relevant to the fundamental dif-
ference test. The Weyerhaeuser court reasoned that the legislative
history of the Act supports the EPA's refusal to consider receiving
water quality as a section 304 effluent reduction benefit factor relevant
to a BPT variance evaluation. 7 The Weyerhaeuser court explained that
the Act's shift to technologically based effluent limitations was aimed
primarily at eliminating the burdensome task of assessing water quality
at individual discharge sites."
Costle, 590 F.2d 1011, 1042 (D.C. Cir. 1978 (receiving water quality not factor relevant to
evaluation of BPT variance request).
6 590 F.2d 1011 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
Id. at 1044.
Id. at 1041.
" See id. at 1041 n.40. In Weyerhaeuser the paper mill operators proposed an en-
vironmental balancing test. Id. The operators asserted that when environmental "debits"
for pollution disposal problems incident to treatment outweighed the environmental
"credits" for preventing discharges into the ocean, the EPA should favor ocean-discharging
plants. Id.
" Id. at 1039; see supra note 12 (section 304(b) factors relevant to establishment of
BPT limitations).
590 F.2d at 1039.
Id. at 1038, 1044.
Id. at 1036, 1042-43. The Weyerhaeuser court stated that Congress wanted to
guarantee uniformity in water pollution regulation to prevent a state from relaxing regula-
tions to encourage industrial growth in the state with the least stringent pollution control
requirements. Id. at 1042. In addition, the Weyerhaeuser court noted that the Act's goal
was the complete elimination of the discharge of pollutants. Id. at 1043. The Weyerhaeuser
court stated that the nation's quality of life depended on the preservation of the nation's
natural bounty. Id. The Weyerhaeuser court concluded that the benefits resulting from the
preservation of the nation's waters outweighed the costs incurred in the elimination of ef-
fluents. Id.
" Id. at 1042-43; see supra note 1 (legislative history supporting EPA's refusal to con-
sider receiving water quality).
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The Ninth Circuit also has concluded that section 304(b) does not re-
quire the EPA to consider receiving water quality at individual plants. 9
In Association of Pacific Fisheries v. EPA," however, the Ninth Circuit
affirmed the EPA's limited consideration of receiving water quality as a
section 304(b) factor relevant to the establishment of BPT limitations for
subcategories of dischargers.7 In Pacific Fisheries, the EPA divided fish
processors into two subcategories.72 The EPA classified processing
facilities not located in population centers as "remote" processors and
facilities located near population centers as "nonremote" processors.3
The EPA applied less stringent BPT requirements to remote proces-
sors.74 In Pacific Fisheries, several nonremote processors questioned the
rationale underlying the EPA's division of fish processors into remote
and nonremote subcategories and protested the EPA's application of
less stringent BPT requirements to remote processors .7 The EPA had
approved different subcategory BPT requirements for remote and non-
remote processors because of fundamental differences in the receiving
water quality and in the implementation costs at the various processing
sites.7 The Pacific Fisheries court upheld the EPA's distinction between
remote and nonremote processors. 7 The Pacific Fisheries court also
determined that the Act permitted the EPA to consider improvements
in receiving water quality as a section 304 effluent reduction benefit
warranting the establishment of different subcategory BPT require-
ments for remote and nonremote processors. 8 The Ninth Circuit rea-
soned that although the Act emphasized pollution limitations based on
technology rather than on water quality," Congress probably did not in-
tend completely to prohibit EPA's consideration of subcategory-wide
1 Crown Simpson Pulp Co. v. Costle, 642 F.2d 323, 327 (9th Cir. 1981).
'0 615 F.2d 794 (9th Cir. 1980).
", See id. at 809 (EPA decided that differences in receiving waters and costs of im-
plementing BPT requirements allowed the establishment of different BPT requirements for
subcategories of Alaskan fish processors).
" See id. at 803-04 (EPA divided fish processors into "remote" and "nonremote" sub-
categories).
13 Id.
1' Id. at 803. In Pacific Fisheries, the EPA required nonremote fish processors to
screen fish solids but allowed remote processors simply to grind solids before discharging
the solids. Id. The EPA stated that the waters into which remote processors discharged
ground effluents were significantly different from the waters into which nonremote pro-
cessors discharged screened effluents. Id.
75 Id.
7 Id. at 803-05; see supra note 74 (different BPT requirements for subcategories of fish
processors).
615 F.2d at 809.
78 Id. at 807.
See id. at 807 n.8. The Pacific Fisheries court acknowledged that in enacting the
Act, Congress intended to free the EPA from constantly showing that improvements in
receiving water quality were due to the application of effluent limitations at particular sites.
Id.
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water quality impacts. 0 The Pacific Fisheries court left open the ques-
tion of whether the EPA must consider receiving water quality when
evaluating individual BPT variance requests after the EPA has con-
sidered receiving water quality when setting subcategory BPT limita-
tions.81
In Crown Simpson Pulp Co. v. Costle,' however, the Ninth Circuit
narrowly interpreted the holding in Pacific Fisheries.' The Crown Simp-
son court stated that the EPA may establish different BPT levels only
for general subcategories of dischargers based on a limited consideration
of receiving water quality in unusual factual situations.' The Ninth Cir-
cuit further stated that the EPA should not consider receiving water
quality when evaluating BPT variances for individual dischargers even
after the EPA has considered receiving water quality in setting subcate-
gory BPT requirements.8 5 In Crown Simpson, two pulp mill companies
sought review of the EPA's denial of a BPT variance request.8 The com-
panies asserted that receiving water quality was a factor relevant to the
fundamental difference test under section 304.' The companies argued
that the EPA must grant a BPT variance request when adherence to
BPT guidelines resulted in non-water quality environmental costs that
were significantly higher than the benefits to receiving water quality.'
The EPA stated that allowing considerations of improvements in receiv-
ing water quality was contrary to the language and intent of the Act.89
The Ninth Circuit upheld the EPA's decision.0 The Ninth Circuit stated
"o Id. The Pacific Fisheries court noted remarks made at a Senate debate as support
for the proposition that the definition of water pollutant varies according to the type and
location of the water involved. Id. at 806 n.7; see LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 1, at
1347-48 (effluents dumped outside bays, where tidal action is present, not considered
pollutants).
", 615 F.2d at 807, n.9.
642 F.2d 323 (9th Cir. '1981).
' Id. at 327; see Note, EPA May Not Consider Quality of Receiving Water in Grant-
ing a Variance From Effluent Limitations, 22 NAT. RESOURCES J. 711, 713 (1982) (com-
parison of Ninth Circuit's decisions in Crown Simpson and Pacific Fisheries).
642 F.2d at 328.
See id. The Crown Simpson court determined that the granting of variances based
on differences in receiving water quality, even in cases where the EPA had considered
receiving water quality when setting subcategory BPT requirements, would return water
pollution control to the pre-1972 ineffective status. Id.
See id. at 325 (paper mill operators asserted that EPA improperly refused to con-
sider receiving water quality as BPT variance factor).
', Id. at 326; see supra note 12 (section 304 factors relevant to fundamental difference
test).
642 F.2d at 326.
Id. at 325. In Crown Simpson, the EPA stated that a fundamental difference in
terms of nonwater quality impact must exist for the EPA to grant a BPT variance. Id. The
Crown Simpson court concluded that the significance of nonwater quality impact due to lack
of improvement in receiving water quality was irrelevant. Id.
' Id. at 327
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that the section 304 fundamental differenct test did not require the EPA
to consider receiving water quality when evaluating BPT variance re-
quests.9' The Crown Simpson court reasoned that Congress intended to
facilitate water pollution control by eliminating the requirement that
the EPA evaluate the impact of various pollution control measures on
various bodies of water.2 A requirement that the EPA consider receiv-
ing water quality at each plant, therefore, would frustrate congressional
intent. 3
The Appalachian III court's rejection of receiving water quality as a
BPT variance factor also is consistent with a prior Fourth Circuit
holding. 4 In Consolidation Coal Co. v. Costle 95 the Fourth Circuit stated
that congressional intent supported the EPA's refusal to consider
receiving water quality as a BPT variance factor." In Consolidation Coal
several coal mining companies protested the EPA's failure to consider
receiving water quality as an environmental benefit relevant to a BPT
variance evaluation. The Fourth Circuit decided that receiving water
quality was not a BPT variance factor. The Consolidation Coal court
reasoned that Congress outlined in the Act a limited number of cases in
which the EPA may consider receiving water quality.9 Section 301(h) of
the Act, for example, authorizes consideration of receiving water quality
as a basis for less stringent discharge standards for publicly owned
treatment works that discharge into marine waters."' The Fourth Cir-
cuit reasoned that the inclusion of section 301(h) in the Act demonstrated
91 Id. at 328.
Id.; see supra notes 42 & 57 (congressional intent underlying Act).
See 642 F.2d at 328 (considerations of receiving water quality contrary to congres-
sional intent).
9' 671 F.2d 801, 808-09 (4th Cir. 1982); see Consolidation Coal Co. v. Costle, 604 F.2d
239, 245 (4th Cir. 1979) (rejection of receiving water quality as BPT variance factor), rev'd in
part sub nom., EPA v. National Crushed Stone Ass'n, 449 U.S. 64 (1980).
15 604 F.2d 239 (4th Cir. 1979), rev'd in part sub nom., EPA v. National Crushed Stone
Ass'n, 449 U.S. 64 (1980).
" Id. at 245. The Consolidation Coal court held that Congress intended to exclude con-
siderations of receiving water quality from BPT variance evaluations. Id. The Consolidation
Coal court noted that Congress, while considering amendments to the water pollution con-
trol program, heard arguments regarding the importance of considering receiving water
quality. Id. The Consolidation Coal court concluded that the absence of an amendment
allowing considerations of receiving water quality demonstrated congressional intent to ex-
clude considerations of receiving water quality. Id.
Id. at 244.
Id. at 245.
Id.; see 33 U.S.C. § 1311(h) (Supp. V 1981) (EPA may consider receiving water quality
when setting BPT limitations for certain publicly owned treatment works).
" See 33 U.S.C. § 1311(h) (1976 & Supp. V 1981). Section 1311(h) authorizes considera-
tion of receiving water quality in granting BPT variance requests for certain publicly owned
treatment works. Id. Unless plants qualify for consideration under § 1311(h), EPA otherwise
considers receiving water quality only as a basis for standards that are more stringent than
the generic BPT limitations. Id.
1983]
WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW
congressional intent to allow EPA's consideration of receiving water
quality only pursuant to specific authorization under the Act.1"'
In Appalachian III, the Fourth Circuit correctly reaffirmed the
EPA's refusal to consider receiving water quality.1"' The Appalachian III
court properly concluded that the Supreme Court decision in National
Crushed Stone undermined the power companies' contention that sec-
tion 301(c) allowed consideration of receiving water quality as a BPT
variance factor." 3 The National Crushed Stone Court construed the
phrase "reasonable further progress" in section 301(c) to limit the applic-
ability of section 301(c) factors to BAT rather that BPT variance evalua-
tions."' The Supreme Court did not limit its analysis of the possible rela-
tionship between section 301(c) and BPT variances to considerations of
section 301(c) cost factors.0 5 The Supreme Court stated that section
301(c) factors in general did not bear a substantial relationship to con-
siderations underlying BPT requirements and therefore were inapplic-
able to BPT variance decisions.0 0 The Supreme Court's holding in Na-
tional Crushed Stone, therefore, prohibits consideration of receiving
water quality as a BPT variance factor to the extent that the Act defines
receiving water quality as a section 301(c) factor."7
The District of Columbia Circuit's decision in Weyerhaeuser and the
Ninth Circuit's holding in Crown Simpson also support the Appalachian
III court's refusal to consider receiving water quality as a section 304
BPT variance factor."' The Weyerhaeuser court held that an analysis of
the congressional intent underlying the Act required the exclusion of
receiving water quality as a section 304(b) effluent reduction benefit fac-
tor."9 The Crown Simpson court also stated that receiving water quality
was not a section 304 factor relevant to the fundamental difference test
604 F.2d at 245. The holding in Consolidation Coal differed from the Fourth Circuit's
holding in Appalachian II. Id.; see 620 F.2d at 1045. The Appalachian I1 court stated in dicta
that receiving water quality may be an appropriate BPT variance factor. Id. The Fourth
Circuit, however, based the Appalachian 1I decision on the rationale that the Supreme
Court later rejected in National Crushed Stone. 620 F.2d at 1045; see EPA v. National
Crushed Stone Ass'n, 449 U.S. at 72 (Supreme Court's affirmance of EPA's exclusion of §
301(c) affordability factors from BPT variance provision).
" 671 F.2d at 808.
103 Id.; see supra note 42 (National Crushed Stone Court rationale underlying decision
that § 301(c) factors did not apply to BPT requirements).
... 449 U.S. 64, 75 (1980).
'o See id. at 73 (section 301(c) is not applicable to BPT standards).
'o, Id.; see supra note 42 (National Crushed Stone Court rationale regarding inap-
plicability of § 301(c) factors to BPT limitations).
... 449 U.S. at 75; see supra notes 30 & 46 (possible inclusion of receiving water quality
as a § 304(b) effluent reduction benefit factor).
10 Crown Simpson Pulp Co. v. Costle, 642 F.2d 323, 327 (9th Cir. 1981); Weyerhaeuser
Co. v. Costle, 590 F.2d 1011, 1036 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
" 590 F.2d at 1042-43; see supra note 67 (Weyerhaeuser court's analysis of congres-
sional intent as support for exclusion of receiving water quality as BPT variance factor).
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for evaluating BPT variance requests.1 ° Weyerhaeuser and Crown Simp-
son therefore support the Appalachian III court's conclusion that the
EPA's refusal to consider receiving water quality as a BPT variance fac-
tor complied with section 304 of the Act."' Furthermore, the Appala-
chian III court's affirmance of the EPA's 1980 variance provision is con-
sistent with the Fourth Circuit's earlier decision in Consolidation Coal.
1 2
The Consolidation Coal court held that the EPA may consider receiving
water quality only pursuant to specific authorization under the Act.
1 3
The Act does not authorize consideration of receiving water quality in
evaluating BPT variance requests by steam electric companies."' Since
Appalachian III involved the validity of a BPT variance regulation for
steam electric companies, the Fourth Circuit correctly concluded that
the EPA must exclude considerations of receiving water quality from
the 1980 BPT variance regulation."'
The Fourth Circuit's holding that section 304 of the Act does not
authorize consideration of receiving water quality as a BPT variance fac-
tor, however, is not entirely consistent with the Ninth Circuit's position
concerning possible limited consideration of receiving water quality
under the Act."' Although the Ninth Circuit stated in both Pacific
Fisheries and Crown Simpson that the EPA's consideration of receiving
water quality at individual plants would frustrate congressional intent,1 7
the Ninth Circuit also concluded that in unusual factual settings, the
EPA may consider receiving water quality when setting BPT require-
ments for subcategories of dischargers."' Section 304 of the Act outlines
the factors that the EPA must consider when setting generic BPT re-
"' 642 F.2d at 327.
C Grown Simpson Pulp Co. v. Costle, 642 F.2d at 327 (Crown Simpson court's rejec-
tion of receiving water quality as BPT variance factor); Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Costle, 590
F.2d at 1036 (Weyerhaeuser court's rejection of receiving water quality as BPT variance
factor).
"' Consolidation Coal Co. v. Costle, 604 F.2d 239, 245 (4th Cir. 1979) (receiving water
quality not considered BPT variance factor), rev'd in part sub nom., EPA v. National Crushed
Stone Ass'n, 449 U.S. 64 (1980).
113 604 F.2d at 245; see supra note 99 (specific authorizations under the Act for con-
sideration of receiving water quality).
' See supra note 18 (Act does not include BPT variance provision).
671 F.2d at 808.
... See 671 F.2d at 808-09 (Appalachian III court's rejection of receiving water quality
as § 304 factor); Crown Simpson Pulp Co. v. Costle, 642 F.2d 323, 328 (9th Cir. 1981) (Ninth
Circuit's recognition of EPA's limited consideration of receiving water quality in unusual
factual settings); Association of Pac. Fisheries v. EPA, 615 F.2d 794, 807 (9th Cir. 1980)
(Ninth Circuit's affirmance of limited consideration of receiving water quality).
117 Crown Simpson Pulp Co. v. Costle, 642 F.2d at 328; Association of Pac. Fisheries v.
EPA, 615 F.2d at 807.
"' Crown Simpson Pulp Co. v. Costle, 642 F.2d at 328; Association of Pac. Fisheries v.
EPA, 615 F.2d at 807; see supra note 74 (Pacific Fisheries court's approval of EPA's con-
sideration of differences in receiving water for remote and nonremote fish processors).
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quirements."' If the EPA, when setting subcategory BPT limitations,
may consider receiving water quality in even a limited number of situa-
tions, then section 304 must authorize the EPA's consideration of receiv-
ing water quality.2
In Appalachian III, the Fourth Circuit cited Weyerhaeuser as
specific support for the EPA's refusal to consider receiving water as a
BPT variance factor.2 ' The Weyerhaeuser court stated that the EPA
must consider the factors outlined in section 304 when evaluating
variance requests."' If section 304 authorizes a consideration of receiv-
ing water quality in establishing subcategory BPT requirements, then
the EPA must consider receiving water quality when evaluating BPT
variance requests." The argument for exclusion of receiving water
quality as a BPT variance factor therefore is reduced to considerations
of practicality. 4
The legislative history of the Act supports the suggestion that con-
sideration of receiving water quality when setting subcategory BPT lim-
itations may be practical in limited instances." Consideration of receiv-
ing water quality on an individual discharger basis, however, may be
totally impractical." 6 An analysis of the legislative history of the Act
clearly reveals congressional desire to facilitate the enforcement of water
pollution regulations by substituting uniform, technologically based
pollution guidelines for the pre-1972 water quality based guidelines that
varied from state to state."7 Varying BPT requirements according to dif-
ferences in receiving water quality at individual plants makes uniformi-
ty impossible and shifts the emphasis in water pollution control back to
water quality standards." The legislative history of the 1972 amend-
ments to the Act, therefore, supports the Fourth Circuit's conclusion in
Appalachian III that receiving water quality is not a BPT variance factor
under the Act."
9
"9 33 U.S.C. § 1314(b)(1)(B) (1976); see supra note 12 (section 304(b) factors relevant to
establishment of BPT guidelines).
'" See EPA v. National Crushed Stone Ass'n, 449 U.S. 64, 70 (1980) (EPA to base BPT
limitations upon regulatory guidelines established under § 304(b)).
12, Appalachian Power Co. v. EPA, 671 F.2d 801, 808 (4th Cir. 1982); Weyerhaeuser v.
Costle, 590 F.2d 1011, 1039 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
" 590 F.2d at 1036.
"2 See EPA v. National Crushed Stone Ass'n, 449 U.S. 64, 77-78 (1980) (EPA must con-
sider § 304 factors used in establishing BPT guidelines when evaluating BPT variance re-
quest).
"' See supra note 1 (elimination of considerations of receiving water quality facilitates
enforcement of water pollution regulations).
" See LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 1, at 1347-48 (EPA may consider tidal water
action when establishing effluent limitations).
" See id. at 1426.
1 See id at 309 (uniformity achieved under the Act by requiring application of effluent
limitations to all plants within a given category, regardless of particular plant's location or
quality of receiving water).
'' See id. (Act aimed at achieving uniformity in pollution control).
12 671 F.2d at 808-09; see id. at 388 (BPT requirements not governed by existing quality
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